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Abstract 
 
 This paper is aimed at structurally assessing the employment effects of the innovative 
activities of firms. We estimate firm level displacement and compensation effects in a model in 
which the stock of knowledge capital raises firm relative efficiency through process innovations 
and firm demand through product innovations. Displacement is estimated from the elasticity of 
employment with respect to innovation in the (conditional or Hicksian) demand for labour. 
Compensation effects are estimated from a firm-specific demand relationship. We also assess 
the enlargement and weakening of these effects due to firm agents’ behaviour aimed at 
appropriating innovation rents. We find that the potential employment compensation effect of 
process innovations surpasses the displacement effect, both in the short and long run (when 
competitors react), and that product innovation doubles the expanding impact by unit of 
expenditure, but also that agents’ behaviour can seriously reduce these effects. The actual 
elasticity of employment to knowledge capital is estimated, however, not far from unity, while 
“passive” productivity growth is suggested to have null or negative employment effects. 
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 1. Introduction 
 
 
 
 The relationship between technology and employment is a lively issue in current 
debates on employment. Frequently, fears are expressed about the job losses associated with 
the introduction of innovations, but economists claim that technology always has two effects of 
the opposite sign. Innovation can destroy some jobs, but also creates others, and the balance 
is expected to be positive. For standard expositions of this line of reasoning see, for example, 
OECD (1994, 1996). Much less is known and said about the working  in practice of these 
mechanisms and their impact on economic policy. 
 
 The basic mechanism is assumed to work, first of all, at the firm level. Formalisations 
of this idea at the firm level can be found, for example, in Stoneman (1983), Katsolaucos 
(1984) and Hamermesh (1993)). At this level, on the one hand, (process) innovations are 
expected to reduce the number of workers needed to produce any given output (displacement 
effect). But, on the other hand, the increased efficiency of labour (and the other factors) will 
cause a reduction in marginal cost which, if passed on to prices, will raise demand and 
employment (compensation effect). The result of these two offsetting effects is generally 
expected to be positive, and its magnitude related to the price elasticity of demand. 
Furthermore, the change in demand may be reinforced by the (product) innovations of firms. 
 
 The result of these two effects only gives, however, the upper bound of the impact that 
innovation can actually have on employment. Agents’ behaviour at the level of the firm, trying 
to appropriate the rents of innovation, can  worsen the displacement effect and weaken the 
compensation effect. If unions take advantage of innovation to bargain higher wages, part of 
the cost savings due to innovation may be offset in this way. If the firm uses the new 
competitive environment to enlarge the exercise of market power by increasing (or not 
lowering sufficiently) prices, the compensation effect will be dampened.      
 
 Hence, the employment impact of innovation depends on the combination of a series 
of technological and product demand characteristics, and their interaction with firm agents’ 
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behaviour. There is, however, a sore lack of empirical studies which attempt to assess the 
working of these forces at the firm level. The main reason is the difficulty of obtaining suitable 
data: firm or plant level panel data for broad samples, including technological indicators and 
enough firm activity measures, to model these relationships taking into account both 
heterogeneity and variables endogeneity. 
  
 Of course, there has been a growing body of literature documenting the creation of 
employment, as well as the behaviour of other performance indicators, in “technology-based” 
or “innovative” firms (see OECD (1998) for a recent survey on this type of studies). 
However, this evidence only provides a reduced-form approach to the employment effects of 
innovation coming from more or less selective samples of firms (starting-up firms, high-growth 
firms...) which limits the scope of the conclusions. In turn, a number of studies have obtained 
results relating employment or employment growth to technological innovation measures in 
broader samples of firms and establishments, often finding a positive correlation (see, for 
example, Doms, Dunne and Roberts (1995)). But the data limitations have often blurred the 
conclusions, at the same time preventing more structural approaches. 
 
Displacement and compensation effects do not necessarily imply the reallocation of 
physical workers, but this type of turnover may be a sign of their operation. Two bodies of 
literature have recently indirectly stressed the likelihood and importance of technological 
displacement and compensation effects by pointing at employment reallocation at the firm 
level. The first type is the literature on job creation and destruction. Even though these studies 
present but a marginal view of intra-plant and intra-firm gross flows, they have already 
uncovered the importance of employment reallocation at this level (see, for example, the 
evidence collected in Davis, Haltiwanger and Schuh (1997)). One important part of this 
reallocation is likely to be technologically influenced or even driven. On a different strand, 
there is the important and growing literature concerning changes in the composition of the 
workforce and their relationship with technological change and, in particular, the generalisation 
of the new technologies (see, for example, Berman, Bound and Griliches (1994) and Machin 
and Van Reenen (1998)). This literature starts from the evidence of the recent demand shift 
towards more highly skilled workers relative to the less skilled, and has developed different 
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tests for the sources of this “skill-biased technical change.” Related studies have explored the 
relationships of these composition changes and the changes in wages and pay inequality (see, 
for example, Chennels and Van Reenen (1998)). As authors studying these facts at the plant 
or firm level have stressed (Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2002), Aguirregabiria and 
Alonso-Borrego (2001)), changes in relative shares are likely to occur as the result of a firm 
level, technologically (and organisationally) driven combination of different degrees of episodes 
of destruction of more unskilled than skilled jobs and creation of more skilled than unskilled 
ones.      
 
 A few studies have adopted a more structural approach to the relationship between 
innovation and employment. Nickell and Kong (1989 a,b) studied the effect of technical 
change on employment with data on a number of UK manufacturing industries, using a 
structural production function and output demand approach very close to the one adopted 
here. And Smolny (1998) constructs a model for the impact of innovations on output, 
employment and prices, estimated from qualitative data on innovation and price changes for a 
sample of German firms. 
 
And, in any case, there are many related studies which can serve to specify the 
relationships involved in a structural assessment of the firm level employment impact of 
innovation. On the one hand, there are the many studies on the effect of innovative activities on 
productivity in the rich tradition started by Griliches (1979) (see the survey by Griliches 
(1995)). Van Reenen (1997) in turn estimates, with panel data on a sample of UK companies, 
a demand for labour explicitly derived from a production function specifying the impact of 
innovations. These studies are relevant to estimating the displacement effects, and they 
probably have not been extended until now, simply because of the lack of suitable data to 
cope with the demand side. On the other hand, there are virtually no examples of firm demand 
relationships estimated across industries, but there is a rich experience cumulated at the 
industry level estimates (see Bresnahan (1989) for an early account) plus some suggestions as 
to how to treat the unobservability of rivals’ prices (Baker and Bresnahan (1988)).  Finally, 
the study of the effects of agents’ behaviour through wage bargaining can be based on the firm 
level type of models set in Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991) or Van Reenen (1996).  
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 This study is aimed at assessing the effects of the innovative activities of firms on their 
employment from a structural point of view. To do that, we estimate firm level displacement 
and compensation effects in a model in which the stock of knowledge capital raises firm 
relative efficiency through the incorporation of innovations. Displacement is given by the 
elasticity of employment with respect to innovation in the (conditional or Hicksian) demand for 
labour, which is estimated alternatively from the production function and from the demand for 
labour. Compensation effects are estimated from a firm specific demand relationship, which 
the stock of knowledge capital shifts through the introduction of product innovations, 
possessing a finite elasticity with respect to the product price. The combination of the 
estimated  elasticities gives the displacement, compensation and total effects of innovations on 
employment.1 But displacement and compensation effects may be respectively enlarged and 
weakened by the behaviour of firm agents if the incorporation of innovations starts wage and 
price changes aimed at appropriating innovation rents. We assess the likelihood of these 
effects through the estimation of  wage bargaining and margin determinants equations. 
 
The model is applied with micropanel data on an (unbalanced) sample of  1,286 
Spanish firms, observed during the period 1990-98.2 The sample is representative of the 
manufacturing population of firms. In particular, firms performing and not performing R&D 
enter the sample according to the population proportions. The data include observations on 
the firms’ output, inputs, R&D expenditures, innovations, demand-related variables and, a 
crucial and rather unusual feature, firms’ individual input and output price changes and some 
firm-market idiosyncratic observations.  
 
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section two explains the theoretical 
framework and defines the different effects to be estimated. Section three specifies the model. 
                                                 
1  Notice that our work is complementary to the firm level exercises aimed at measuring the skills 
composition change and its sources. Once the total amount of labour to be shed and/or contracted is 
determined, the firm can optimally decide its composition among different types of workers according to a 
conditional cost minimisation problem that takes into account the post-innovation productivity, adjusting 
costs and so on for each type of worker. Here is where specifications in the tradition of Berman, Bound 
and Griliches (1994) begin.  
2 The data come from the Encuesta Sobre Estrategias Empresariales (ESEE), a firm level panel survey of 
Spanish manufacturing starting in 1990, sponsored by the Ministry of Industry. 
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Section four details the econometric equations. Section five introduces the data, variables and 
highlights some facts. Section six presents the empirical results and  Section seven concludes. 
Appendix A gives details on the data and employed variables. Appendix B reports the details 
on the construction of  the knowledge capital. 
 
2. Theoretical framework 
  
 This section is aimed at explaining the theoretical firm-level framework and 
relationships on which we base our empirical model. Firstly, we define the basic set-up  and 
the displacement and compensation effects. Then we show how to account for the fact that the 
basic effects can be modified by the firm agents’ behaviour. The next section further specifies 
the model in order to build the empirical counterpart. 
 
 Assume a cost minimising firm with a constant returns to scale technology in the 
conventional inputs, which competes in a product differentiated market. The firm currently 
invests in R&D activities in order to obtain process and product innovations. Innovations, 
when obtained,  are incorporated into production at the beginning of the following period. 
When this period begins, the firm adjusts the product price, output and employment according 
to its new technology and expected demand. 
 
 Suppose for the moment that innovation effects on technology and demand can be 
represented by the impact of variations in the accumulated “knowledge” capital,3  which we 
denote by K . Let ),( Kwc  be marginal cost, where w stands for the vector of input prices, 
and let m  be the mark-up the firm charges on marginal cost,4 p  the product price, Y  output, 
L  employment, de an indicator of market expected dynamism, and KR  and Rp  rivals’ 
knowledge capital and prices. At a given moment, employment will be the result of the price 
                                                 
3 Since Griliches (1979) this specification has been the standard framework for exploring the effects of R&D 
activities of firms, and hence innovation, on productivity. See below. 
4 Hence m+1  is the ratio price-marginal cost and 
pcm
pcm
-
=
1
m ,  where 
p
cp
pcm
-
=  is the Lerner index of 
market power.  
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set by the firm, determining (expected) output, and deriving the labour needs according to the 
following equations (we drop firm and time subindices for simplicity): 
 
),()1( Kwcp m+=                 (1) 
),,,,( RR
e KKppdDY =    (2) 
YKwcL L ),(=     (3) 
 
where Lc  stands for the derivative of marginal cost with respect to the price of labour 
(Shephard’s lemma). Hence, employment is given by the semi-reduced form 
 
),,),,()1(,(),( RR
e
L KKpKwcdDKwcL m+= , 
 
and the short-run5 employment impact of innovation can be written as 
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Multiplying by LK / , and assuming a Hicks-neutral impact of the knowledge capital 
variations, we obtain the overall effect  
 
)( hele ++-                          (4) 
 
where e  is the absolute value of the (output conditional or Hicksian) elasticity of labour with 
respect to K , l  is the elasticity of demand with respect to K , h is the absolute value of the 
elasticity of demand with respect to price, and the second term in parenthesis follows from the 
equality of the elasticities of marginal cost and labour with respect to knowledge capital.6 If the 
impact of knowledge capital were not Hicks-neutral, which is necessarily associated with an 
elasticity of substitution s  different from unity, the absolute value of the conditional elasticity 
                                                 
5 Before the competitors react, in particular, by introducing similar innovations (see below). 
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of labour with respect to K would differ from the absolute value of the elasticity of marginal 
cost with respect to knowledge capital .7 
 
Expression (4) gives the overall effect of innovation on employment, in the form of 
sensitivity of employment to variations of the knowledge capital. The first term of (4) gives the 
displacement effect, the second the sum of two compensation effects: firstly, the demand effect 
of product innovations; secondly,  the demand effect of passing on the cost reduction to the 
product price. An important consequence of (4) is that the overall effect of innovation on 
employment or, at least, its upper bound corresponding to the absence of offsetting effects, 
can be assessed from the estimation of three elasticities, one which characterises technology 
and two which correspond to the firm’s demand relationship. In case of biased technological 
change, an additional technological elasticity must be estimated. 
 
Innovation can trigger behaviour on the part of the firms’ agents which may change this 
potential effect. Suppose that, at the beginning of the period at which an innovation is going to 
be implemented: a) the firm must bargain the wage Lw  with a union that is concerned with the 
pay and employment consequences of the innovation; and b) the firm considers (optimal) 
changes in its pricing behaviour (changes in m) according to the new competition environment 
induced by innovation. Let z  stand for other possible determinants of wages and mark-ups, 
and add two (probably reduced form)8 equations to the relationships which are relevant to 
employment determination 
 
),( Kzww LL =            (5) 
),( Kzmm =             (6) 
                                                 
7 Think of factor L in terms of efficiency, LKgL )(* = , with price 
)(
*
Kg
w
w LL = . In this case at=
¶
¶
K
c
c
K
, 
where a is the elasticity of output with respect to labour (see footnote 9) and t the elasticity of function g 
with respect to knowledge capital. Demand for labour is Y
Kg
wc
L L
)(
)( *
= , and it is not difficult to show that 
the absolute value of the elasticity of L with respect to K can be approximated as atts +- )1( . 
8 A sensible structural specification of the wage equation will probably include the firm market power 
through expected pricing, while the structural margin equation is likely to take wages as given adopting a 
“right to manage” modelling perspective.  
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Now, employment is given by the semi-reduced form  
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and multiplying by LK /  we again obtain an overall short-run effect in terms of elasticities 
 
)()()1( agqhhelgae +-++---          (7) 
where a  is the elasticity of output with respect to labour, g  is the elasticity of wage with 
respect to K, and q  is the elasticity of the price-cost ratio with respect to K.9  
 
 Expression (7) shows, through two additional terms to expression (4), that agents’ 
behaviour is likely to worsen the expulsion effects and lessen the compensation effects. The 
displacement or expulsion effect can be reinforced by a labour substitution effect as the result 
of increased wages. Compensation effects may be weakened by higher prices as the result of 
higher wages and/or mark-ups. The assessment of  (7) requires, in addition to the previous 
parameters, the use of an estimate of the technological elasticity a  and the estimation of two 
behavioural elasticities: wages and margins with respect to innovation. 
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a)1(  , where the second term on the right is likely to be 
small and can be neglected in approximations. If the underlying production function presents constant 
elasticity of substitution, the whole right hand collapses to )1( as -- . 
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3. Model specification 
 
 Let us now further specify the relationships involved in order to build up the 
econometric model. In doing so, we adopt some more particular constraints. Some of them 
will be tested in the empirical exercise, but the relaxation of others would be a useful exercise 
which is left for later steps of the research. 
 
 Assume that the firm production function takes the form 
 
10),,,()( 1 <<= e
e MLCFKtAY                                     (8) 
 
where )(tA gives the degree of efficiency reachable for any firm, independently of its R&D 
activities, as a result of learning, knowledge spill-overs, embodied technological change and so 
on.10 1K  is the relevant stock of knowledge (see below) and F stands for the conventional 
inputs production function, where C represents capital stock, L the labour input and M raw 
materials.11 This specification implies a cost function 
e
1)(
)(),,(
KtA
Y
wcKYwC =  and a 
(Hicksian) labour demand  
 
e
1)(
)(
)(
KtA
Y
wc
w
C
L L
L
=
¶
×¶
=                                             (9) 
 
where )(×c and )(×Lc  are homogeneous of degree one and zero respectively.  Notice that e  
and a  can be estimated both from (8) and (9), parameter e  through the coefficients on 
technological capital, and parameter a  through the coefficients on labour changes and wage 
changes respectively (see footnote 9). 
 
Assume that firm demand can be written as 
                                                 
10 If investment goods are not adjusted for quality change, part of the embodied productivity growth can 
appear as disembodied, see Hulten (1992).  
11 We start then from the beginning imposing Hicks-neutrality of all productivity increments. This 
assumption will be confronted with the data and tested in the empirical part. 
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( ) ),,(~2 ReR ppdDKKY Rll=                                         (10’) 
 
where 2K  represents the relevant knowledge capital and KR knowledge capital of market 
competitors.12 One of the main problems at the time of estimating a relationship as  (10’) is the 
absence of direct information on the rivals’ prices and knowledge capital.13 However, 
assuming that every firm in the relevant market faces the same technology and input prices, we 
can write 
e
m
R
RR KtA
wc
p
)(
)(
)1( += . Substituting for the prices of rivals (that is, using the 
“residual demand” approach of Baker and Bresnahan (1988))14 we have the relationship 
 
( ) ),),(,,,(2 RReR KtAwpdDKKY R mll=                                        (10) 
 
The advantage of (10) is that it somewhat mitigates the estimating problems of (10’): w is 
observable under the assumption of common input prices, and changes in RK   and  Rm  are 
likely to be less frequent and easier to proxy. Elasticities l  and h can be estimated in 
relationship (10), from which Rl  and even a cross-price elasticity Rh  could be estimated with 
enough data. 
 
 The specification of a knowledge capital measure as a weighted sum of past gross 
investments in R&D has become since Griliches (1979)  the standard framework for exploring 
the effects of R&D activities, and hence innovation, on productivity.15  Two critical aspects of 
this specification are, however, the implicit assumptions of a continuous and smooth 
transformation of research effort into innovations, and of these innovations into productivity 
increments (see, for example, Griliches (2000)). We will improve on the traditional 
                                                 
12 Notice that we don’t try to distinguish between rivals’ operative capitals. 
13 The replacement of the right variables by sector averages computed at some breakdown detail of 
standard industry classifications is an oft-employed device which is likely to introduce serious 
mismeasurement errors.  
14 See also Scheffman and Spiller (1987). 
15 See, for example, Hall and Mairesse (1995) for a recent application. Klette (1996) uses a similar framework, 
but innovating in the specification of the stock of knowledge, and Crepon, Duguet and Mairesse (1998) 
experiment with the direct  modelling of the impact of innovations.    
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specification by employing the information available on innovation to model the transformation 
of research into productivity improvements. Let knowledge capital tK  depend as usual on 
past investments R and depreciation rate d , 11)1( -- +-= ttt RKK d , but define  the 
“operative” knowledge capitals 1K  and 2K  (for process and product innovations, 
respectively) as 
 
1)1( --+= jtjttjtjt KdKdK ,      2,1=jfor                       (11) 
 
where jtd  (j=1,2) are dummy variables which take value one at time t if the firm introduces 
an innovation (process and product innovation, respectively). This amounts to the construction 
of two “step” functions with the following rate of change  behaviour: 
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Hence productivity and demand changes are expected to be associated with the introduction 
of innovations of each kind as well as to be proportional to the change that the stock of 
knowledge capital has experienced since the last innovation of each type. We also construct 
and use a third operative version of capital K3 , shifting at any innovation, to model price 
changes.  
 
 If wages are to be set, it seems natural to assume that they will be bargained over 
when an innovation is going to be applied. To determine the variables which must enter the 
wage equation, we will use the model of bargaining over wages between a union and a firm in 
which the firm sets subsequent employment unilaterally (the “right to manage” model of 
Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991); see also Van Reenen (1996)). The general Nash 
solution to this bargain is 
1
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w
ww L
Sw
L
AL , where wA stands for alternative 
income, LwSLSw eee =  is the (absolute value of the) elasticity of the probability of being 
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employed in the firm the following period (“survival” probability) with respect to wage, b 
represents union bargaining power and 
p
LwL  is the ratio of labour costs to profits.  Assuming 
that the union is concerned about current employment  at the moment of bargaining (L-1), our 
model particular specification gives the equilibrium condition 
 
e
ee
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where SLe  is the (positive) elasticity of survival with respect to expected employment, with 
derivative 0' <SLe  (see Layard et al. (1991), pp.537), and where L
e is a function, among 
other things, of de , w, K and pcme.  
 
Equation (12) shows that firm bargained wages are likely to differ from alternative 
income through the operation of different mechanisms. Firstly, wages will be higher the higher 
surviving probability is, linked to expected employment at the firm in the next period. 
Secondly, wages will be higher the higher union bargaining power b is. The first reason gives 
the rationale for including in the wage equation the changes embodied in de and, of course, 
knowledge capital K (and also perhaps expected input price changes). The second suggests 
including union bargaining power changes. Thirdly, there is the likely important role of market 
power. The sign of the effect of market power, however,  is not defined a priori (see, for 
example, Nickell, Vainiomaki and Wadhwani (1994)).  Notice that market power enters the 
equation for two reasons with opposite effects: stimulating rent sharing but also depressing 
employment perspectives eL given the value of the other indicators.  
 
 The elasticity of demand with respect to price is assumed to be independent of K (see 
equation 10’). Hence, changes in m  must come from changes in the firm itself and in rivals’ 
behaviour (e.g., in the degree of collusion, and hence in the sustainable price, or in the relative 
leader-follower pricing roles). Then, in regressing margins on innovation (through knowledge 
capital K3, taking into account KR), it seems natural to try to control directly for changes of 
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behaviour through Rm  and also for exogenous variables which are likely to trigger these 
changes. The main variable of the latter type is market expected dynamism de  (see, for 
example,  the cyclical pricing models summarised in Tirole (1989)). This is what we will do in 
specifying the margin equation. 
 
4. Econometric model 
 
 Let us specify the econometric model to estimate the relevant elasticities. The model 
consists of four equations, based on the differentiation of the theoretical relationships (8), (10), 
and the theoretical suggestions on wage and price determinants, plus the dual alternative for 
the first equation based on the differentiation of (9). Equations model the firm production 
function (demand for labour), product demand, and wage and margins formation. Dropping 
firm and time subscripts for simplicity, and using lowercase letters to represent log differences, 
the equations may be expressed as follows: 
 
110 vDcumlcky cumcp +++++++= bbbabeb                                                       (13) 
 
'
1
'
1
'
0 )1( vDkywwwl pmmlcc ++-++--+= bebabb                                             (13’) 
 
)(20 mmlccRadd wwwpadky babhhddld +++-+++=                     
                    2)( vDk RRRR ++D+-+ dmdehl m                             (14) 
 
mmccadu
e
lwl wwaduww jjjjjjj ++++++= 0                                          
               301 vDbpcmkn bn ++D+D+++ - jjjgj m                    (15) 
 
430
~ vDkkd RkRd ++++D++=D rrqmrrrm m                                                       (16) 
                                
where yp, yd, c, l, n, m, k1, k2, k3, k and kR are, respectively, the rates of growth of output, 
sales, capital, labour (total hours, say), workers,  materials, and the relevant knowledge 
capitals (process, product, process and product, total, rivals); p, wc , wl and wm are the rates 
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of growth of the relevant prices; elw  and u  are the “outsider” factors, the economy- wide 
wage rate of growth and unemployment rate, respectively; pcmD  stands for the differences of 
the Lerner index, bD  for the differences of the union bargaining power indicator, and 
)1ln(~ mm +D=D are the log differences of the price cost ratio. The theoretical specifications 
of the previous section are slightly modified by substituting a market dynamism index (d) and 
the firm  advertising growth rate (a) for the expected demand index de. To account for the 
union bargaining power we will employ the (inverse) index given by the proportion of 
temporary workers. D represents the set of dummy variables to be included at each equation 
(see details on the variables in Section 4 and Appendix A).  
  
 We are not able to observe variables KR and RmD  directly, but we are going to use 
two sensible proxies for them. Variations in competitors’ knowledge capital could be roughly 
approximated by the differences of a dichotomised  variable of contents )0(1 >- kk R , if 
available. This variable would substitute 1 for high relative growth states and zero for the 
opposite. According to our model, kk R -  governs the evolution of the firm market share 
relative to its competitors once prices are controlled for. Hence, we will use as an indicator the 
available dummy variable “rivals share increase” (rsi). Similarly, we will substitute an available 
dummy variable that indicates when the firm has decreased price as a result of a change of 
competitors’ prices for the rivals’ margin changes. Competitor margins are likely to be falling 
when the observed firm is forced to reduce prices as the result of a decrease of rivals’ prices.  
We will call this variable “rivals’ price decrease” (rpd). 
 
Estimation of production function (13) makes it important to control for input 
utilisation, and hence our inclusion of the variable capacity utilization (cu). Labour demand 
(13’), wages (15) and margins (16) are likely in turn to present some delay in their adjustment. 
We will test for the suitability of dynamic versions of these three equations by including  the 
dependent variable lagged one period and accordingly using the long-term elasticity when 
relevant. 
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 Equations are specified in log differences or rates of growth. This has two important 
implications. Firstly, equations can be read as approximations to the time differentiation of the 
relevant relationships, and hence they imply no assumptions on functional forms. In fact, 
differenced equations are even compatible with the lack of the Hicks-neutrality property which 
we have imposed through knowledge capitals entering the equations multiplicatively. Secondly, 
any level time invariant individual or heterogeneous effects (like differences in firms’ efficiency, 
employed labour, demand size, wage or margin levels) are differenced out. Moreover, the sets 
of dummies included at each equation enlarge the flexibility of the specification by allowing for 
unspecified forms of heterogeneity in rates of growth.  
 
 Coefficients are elasticities (or approximate elasticities). Notation stresses the 
elasticities of main interest ),,,,,,,( qghhllae RR  and equality constraints across equations 
are underlined keeping the same symbols. Parameters a  and e  can be alternatively estimated 
either from the production function (13) or labour demand (13’), parameters l  and h are 
estimated from the demand relationship (14), parameter g  from the wage equation (15) and 
parameter q  from the margin equation (16). 
 
 Theory points out some constraints which can either be tested and imposed on 
estimation in order to gain efficiency, or used to assess the likelihood of the estimates. 
Constant returns to scale imply  1=++ mc bab  in equation (13) and the unit coefficient on y 
in equation (13’). Homogeneity of degree zero of )(wcL  implies 0)1(
'' =+-- mc bab  in 
equation (13’). Homogeneity of degree one of )(wc implies that mlc ddd ++  provides an 
estimate of the cross-price elasticity of demand in equation (14).  
 
5. Data, variables, and some facts. 
 
 Model estimation is carried out with an unbalanced panel data sample of 1,286 
manufacturing firms, observed during the period 1990-1998, which comes from the broader 
sample of the official survey ESEE (see footnote 2). The sample employed here results from 
retaining the firms with more than three consecutive time observations after dropping all the 
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time observations for which the data needed to perform the exercise are incomplete. It can be 
considered approximately representative of manufacturing, and hence inferences can be taken 
to be globally valid for this ambit. In particular the sample includes, approximately in 
population proportions, surviving, entrant and exiting firms, although also experiences some 
decay over time due to attrition. More details are provided in Appendix A. 
 
 The data required for each firm include its output and sales, capital, labour and 
intermediate inputs (materials and purchase of services), its innovative and advertising 
expenditures and introduction of process and product innovations, its costs, the changes in the 
product price and the price changes experienced in the input markets,  some market evolution 
details and an extensive list of identity variables (activity, age, participation in mergers and 
acquisitions, and so on). A unique feature of the data set is the availability of information on the 
changes in the prices set by the firm, and on the changes in the prices that the firm pays for its 
non-labour inputs. A decisive advantage of the employed data set is the availability of 
information on a number of key market idiosyncratic variables provided by the firm. This 
ensures that the variables are referred to the right market boundaries, as defined by the firm. 
Details on all the employed variables are provided in Appendix A. Let us briefly comment here 
on some characteristics of a few key variables. 
 
 To construct knowledge capital we use the yearly sum of all R&D expenditures 
(intramural, contracted outside and the acquisition of licenses abroad). Standard knowledge 
capital is obtained, as usual, recursively on a yearly basis by depreciating the existing  stock by 
0.15% and adding adequately deflated current investments (see Hall and Mairesse (1995)) . 
Knowledge capital when the firm enters the sample is estimated with data on the firms’ age, 
but only the firms with some observed R&D expenditure while they are in the sample are 
assumed to have a non-zero capital. Operative capitals for process and product innovation are 
obtained as described above, using the innovation data. More details are given in Appendix B.  
 
 A process innovation is assumed to occur when the firm answers positively to the 
question of whether it has introduced some significant modification of the productive process 
(affecting machines, organisation or both) along the year. The question appears in the 
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questionnaire along with all the other R&D and innovation related-questions, and is clearly 
separated from other sections on technology adoption and usage. A product innovation is 
assumed to occur when the firm answers positively to the question of whether it has obtained 
completely new products or products with such important modifications (affecting materials, 
components, design, functionality) which made them different from the old ones. Hence it is 
likely that answers indicate precisely what firms consider major innovative changes in their 
productive process and products, as well as the frequency of these changes.  
 
 Table 1 reports the sample arranged according to firm size (the sample must be 
understood to consist of two subsamples, firms with up to 200 workers and firms with more 
than 200 workers; see  Appendix A). Ninety-two percent of the biggest firms have R&D 
expenditures, but only 41% of the smaller ones do. Data for these firms are accordingly 
reported distinguishing between R&D performers and non-performers (non-zero and zero 
knowledge capital). The table also reflects the frequency with which firms introduce 
innovations. The figures of frequency of innovations are constructed by averaging across firms 
the relative frequencies or proportions of their time observations in which they report 
innovations. Innovation is highly correlated with knowledge capital and higher for the biggest 
firms. R&D performing firms show a probability of introducing innovations a given year which 
fluctuates from one third to a half. 
 
 Interestingly, the data cover a complete industrial cycle. At the beginning of the 
nineties, manufacturing experienced an important downturn that reached bottom in 1993. 
Next, manufacturing recovered steadily with only a minor halt in 1996. Labour, labour 
productivity and even knowledge capital accumulation reflect this evolution in the figures 
reported in  Table 1.  
 
Average figures of knowledge capital accumulation, labour evolution and labour 
productivity growth show a heterogeneous picture with some puzzling aspects, at least at first 
sight. For example, labour slightly decreases over the nineties at the small non-performing firms 
and slightly increases at the small performing ones. This could be taken naively as evidence of 
the positive employment impact of innovation. But knowledge capital accumulation turns out to 
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be similar for the R&D performing firms of any size, and employment falls sharply in the 
biggest firms. Obviously, a more complex look at the data is needed to say something. 
A simple accounting identity tells us that the variation in employment is minus labour 
productivity growth plus output growth. If we then split labour productivity growth into its 
sources and output growth into its components, we can transform the identity into a 
decomposition. In particular, we can isolate the labour productivity and output rates of growth 
attributable to innovation and assess their partial and global role. This is what our model does. 
A crucial test of its usefulness will be its contribution to a satisfactory explanation of the 
average figures of Table 1 and their relationships.  
 
6. Empirical results 
 
 In this section we proceed to report and comment on the results of the estimation of 
equations 13(13’)-16. Tables 2 to 5 present the results, and the main estimated elasticities are 
summarised in table 6. Estimations share a number of characteristics that we detail in what 
follows. 
  
Equations include industry dummies (18) and yearly time dummies (1991-98), 16 as 
well as two dummies to pick up the likely heterogeneity of the firms born during the period and 
the firms which are going to die before its end. Moreover, to control for large discrete 
changes, we include  dummies when a merger/acquisition or a scission affects a firm. Industry 
and time variables are always included with their coefficients constrained to add up to zero 
(Suits method), and hence a constant can be included in each regression to give account of a 
general mean. Coefficients for the control variables are not reported in order to save space, 
but the value of the constant plays an important role in interpreting some results. 
 
All equations constitute linear models with predetermined and endogenous variables 
and we apply GMM techniques for their estimation (for a recent review of the methods 
available for estimating such equations, see Arellano and Honoré (2002)). Instrumental 
                                                 
16These sets may be suppressed in a particular equation when they become irrelevant or can be 
meaningfully replaced by a variable: e.g. the macroeconomic wage replaces time dummies in equation (16). 
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variables used in each equation are detailed at the bottom of each table. In general they exploit 
a mix of moments involving lagged levels of the variables, some lagged values of the 
differenced variables, and certain variables of other equations which can be taken as 
exogenous for the particular equation considered. Sargan tests of the overidentifying 
restrictions are reported for each estimate. 
 
 Implicit equations in levels are always supposed to present an uncorrelated zero mean 
disturbance, and hence disturbances of the differenced equations are expected to show a 
significant negative first order autocorrelation and an absence of correlation of higher orders. 
Each estimate includes the m1 and m2 Arellano and Bond (1991) tests to confirm that this is the 
pattern of the obtained residuals. 
  
6.1 Production function and labour demand equations. 
      
 Production function estimation is carried out taking knowledge capital and labour as 
endogenous variables, and capital as predetermined. Results are summarised in Table 2, the 
preferred outcome is estimate e, and estimates a to d are presented to check its robustness. 
 
On the one hand, constant returns to scale in the conventional inputs capital, labour 
and materials are easily accepted (see estimate a and the Wald test for this restriction). On the 
other, output presents identical elasticities with respect to workers (n) and working hours per 
worker (h), although more imprecisely estimated in the case of h (see estimate b). Therefore, 
we specify the labour input as total hours of work (l). This greatly simplifies the specification of 
the rest of the equations (in general we will not distinguish between the two input dimensions) 
without any loss of generality: our employment conclusions will be referred to the total hours of 
work demanded by firms. Utilisation of capacity turns out to be an important variable to 
explain production shifts, but its inclusion virtually doesn’t change the coefficients of the other 
variables (see estimate c). 
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 Input coefficients show likely values and, in particular, the capital elasticity estimate 
avoids the endemic problems found with estimators in differences17. The implicit capital weight 
in value added takes the sensible value of 0.36.  Importantly, the elasticity of output with 
respect to knowledge capital shows a plausible value, inside the range of the values obtained 
by the best estimates of this type of augmented production functions, and the operative capital 
specification clearly outperforms the use of the standard knowledge capital (see estimate d). In 
addition, a remarkable feature of the estimate is that only a scarce 1% of total factor 
productivity growth remains to be explained. Recall that we interpret this growth as the result 
of all the non-accounted determinants of productivity growth: spill-overs, learning, embodied 
technical change and so on. 
 
The estimation of the demand for labour function must allow us to reassess the 
estimates of the parameters of interest from a dual perspective. Our results, summarised in 
Table 3, and the preferred estimate d, turn out to confirm the previous estimates, but also 
contribute new insights on the sources of productivity growth. Estimations are carried out 
assuming that wages and knowledge capital are endogenous, treating the capital user cost as 
predetermined, and taking into account the correlation of lagged labour with the disturbances. 
  
 According to the result of our previous testing, we impose constant returns to scale 
from the start, constraining the output coefficient to unity. Our equation can then be seen as 
basically regressing labour requirements growth (minus the growth of productivity) on input 
prices and knowledge capital. Theory indicates the expected value for the input price 
coefficients and their sum. Estimate a and a Wald test allows us to accept this constraint, and 
the value of the coefficients in the preferred estimation are remarkably close to their 
theoretically expected values.  
 
 With labour specified in total effective hours of work (normal hours plus overtime 
minus loss hours), and given the weight reached at that time by temporary workers in the 
labour force of Spanish manufacturing, it is highly unlikely to obtain an equation with strong 
dynamics derived from adjustment costs or even any dynamics at all. In fact, only a very small 
                                                 
17 For discussions of this problem see Blundell and Bond (1998) and Griliches and Mairesse (1997). 
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and non-significant dynamic effect shows up, which we do not drop from the equation only to 
avoid the impact on other coefficients (see estimate b). 
 
 The coefficient on knowledge capital is sensible, clearly superior to the one given by 
specifiying the standard knowledge capital (see equation c), but also presents a value 
somewhat higher than the value obtained in the production function. In what follows we 
advance reasons to think that this can be a slightly biased estimate, and hence why we will 
stick to the value previously obtained. 
 
 A puzzling characteristic of the estimates of the labour demand function is the high and 
significant average rate of autonomous labour productivity growth measured by the constant 
(3.8%), which sharply contrasts with the production function total factor estimate (1%). This is 
especially surprising when prices are in principle satisfactorily accounting for labour substitution 
(showing the right elasticities) and knowledge capital accounts for even more productivity 
growth  than expected. Detailed justification of the sources of this divergence lies outside of 
the scope of this paper, but careful theoretical and empirical checking has allowed us to trace 
back its main origin to the firm processes of “outsourcing” of several activities during the 
period.18  
 
This source offers the unique combination of  input changes that are not likely to show 
up in the production function estimate of productivity growth while, at the same time, they will 
imply a strong “autonomous” increase of labour productivity.19 Shadow price fluctuations not 
accounting for the observed prices, and biased (labour or capital saving) technical change 
linked to a non-unity elasticity of substitution, very unlikely given the price coefficient estimates, 
                                                 
18 The “outsourcing” or contracting out of manufacturing activities and business services has been a 
growing characteristic of manufacturing firms during the eighties and nineties, particularly the biggest 
ones. See Abraham and Taylor (1996) for evidence on this fact in relation to business services in US 
industry; Aguirregabiria and Alonso-Borrego (2001) document it in Spanish industry at the end of the 
eighties; Delgado, Jaumandreu and Martin (1999) show its relationship with the industrial cycle during the 
nineties.   
19 Recall that the rationale for the “outsourcing” of a task is that the cost of performing it inside the firm 
turns out to be at least as high as contracting it out. This will imply substitution of intermediate 
consumption for labour for approximately the same value, virtually without impact on total factor 
productivity growth, i.e., MwLw ML D@D  and hence for changes with this origin will hold the 
equality ml mba @- .  
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have been in turn tested and rejected as explanations for the divergence.20 The implication is 
however that the absence of a variable to account explicitly for the outsourcing-rooted 
productivity increases may bias the estimated knowledge capital elasticity.  
 
 Production function and labour demand give us estimates of parameters e  and a . 
Given the slight misspecification of the labour demand equation, we assume the estimates 
provided by the production function, which we report in the summary of elasticities of Table 6,  
to be confirmed and more reliable. 
 
6.2 The product demand equation. 
 
 Our specification relies on the information provided by the firms on their price changes 
and on some firm and market idiosyncratic facts. It turns out to provide very sensible results 
on the demand impacts of the own and rivals’ prices and knowledge capitals, even if estimates 
are more imprecise in the case of the competitors’ effects as a result of the nature of the 
employed variables. 
 
 Our estimation takes knowledge capital, price, and the dummy indicating rivals’ share 
increases as endogenous variables; and the index of market dynamism, the rate of growth of 
advertising, the user cost of capital and the dummy indicating rivals’ price decreases as 
predetermined.  Results are summarised in Table 4, where d is the preferred estimate.  
 
 The constant of the estimations shows a small, negative and scarcely significant 
autonomous trend in the growth of real sales, while the index of market expansion and the rate 
of growth of advertising expenditures account jointly for significant movements in the firm’s 
demand. The elasticity of demand with respect to the own price seems sensibly estimated (-
                                                 
20 Shadow prices impact was checked by adding to the equation a utilisation indicator. The result was 
significant but without  impact on the coefficients and the constant. The likelihood of  an elasticity of 
substitution different from unity was tested by estimating the s value corresponding to  composite price 
changes of the form )(45.0)(65.0 cmcl wwww -+-- , with the result of 95.0ˆ =s with a standard error of 
0.28. 
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2.4).21 Interestingly enough, this value is only reached when  the variables aimed at giving 
account of the rivals’ price (and knowledge capital) movements are included (compare 
regressions a and b with the preferred specification). On the other hand, the elasticity of 
demand with respect to the own knowledge capital also detects an important effect (1.89). 
Again, the operative capital specification turns out to be superior (compare estimate c). 
 
 Rivals’ price changes, specified through the inclusion of the input price changes and the 
rivals’ price decrease dummy variable (to represent changes in behaviour), seem reasonably 
picked up. The value estimated for this elasticity is 0.87, a sensible outcome which exhibits in 
particular a reasonable magnitude with respect to the own-price elasticity (see Table 6).   
 
 Recall that rivals’ knowledge capital must enter the equation for two reasons: as a 
direct indicator and as an argument for the rivals’ price specification. Given the value of its 
coefficient, the dummy indicating rivals’ share increases seems to pick up convincingly the 
impact of this knowledge capital (this must be the case once the price reasons for share 
movements are already controlled for). The value for the elasticity of sales with respect to 
rivals’ knowledge capital, -0.47, turns out to be again sensibly estimated (see Table 6). 
 
 The key estimates of the demand function are the own-price and own-knowledge 
capital elasticity estimates, on which the compensation effects of innovation hinge. But the  
identification of the corresponding rivals’ effects on the demand of the firm will allow us to 
measure (although more imprecisely) the suggested long-run effects of innovation (i.e., when 
the process and product innovations are also adopted by the competitors).     
  
6.3 Wage and margin equations. 
 
 The estimation of these equations is aimed at assessing the degree by which the firm 
agents’ behaviour dampens the working of the compensation effects of innovation. Together 
                                                 
21This elasticity implies, however, an average margin higher than observed with our Lerner index or mark-
up measurements. But notice that, in replacing marginal cost by average cost, these estimates are likely to 
wrongly include many fixed outlays at the cost estimation. Our specification does not rely in any case on 
the level of these estimates.  
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they form a subsystem in which we assume wages to be set in bargaining in accordance, 
among other things, to the expected firm pricing behaviour, and the firm setting its prices given 
the bargained wage. Rents from innovation turn out to result on average in somewhat higher 
wages and, particularly, price increases. 
 
 The wage equation is estimated considering employment, knowledge capital, the firm 
margin and the proportion of temporary workers as endogeneous variables, as well as taking 
into account the correlation of lagged wage with the disturbances. Estimation also instruments 
the rate of growth of advertising and the user cost of capital with lagged differences, and the 
price of intermediate consumption with the price of raw materials. This may be necessary 
because of the substitution of realised values for the theoretically needed expectations formed 
at time t-1 on these variables. The margin equation is estimated taking knowledge capital and 
rivals’ share increases as endogenous variables and rivals’ price decreases as predetermined. 
Estimates of both equations are presented in Table 5, and preferred estimates are b and a. 
 
 Results from the estimation of the wage equation give a sensible “insider-outsider” 
wage relationship, fully comparable to similar estimates. Dynamics is low, showing quick wage 
adaptation. As far as the “outsider” factors are concerned, bargained wage closely follows the 
economy-wide wage trend and tends to react negatively to widespread unemployment. 
“Insider” factors may be divided in turn into two sets. Firm expected demand-related 
variables, and input prices other than labour, enter the equation with the expected signs and 
more or less significance. None of these variables are crucial nor determine the other 
coefficients (see estimate a).  
 
Lagged employment and knowledge capital are the most interesting “insider” factors. 
Lagged employment represents the number of employers concerned about their future when 
wage is bargained for. Its coefficient, although imprecisely estimated, shows the sign expected 
in these types of models and can be interpreted accordingly: wages tend to be lower the higher 
the number of insiders for a given employment perspective. The coefficient on k also shows 
the expected sign: an increase in knowledge capital indicates the firm’s potential for larger 
employment, favouring the pressure for higher wages. 
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 Union power, represented by the temporary workers proportion (inverse) index, 
increases the likelihood of higher wages. And firm market power, represented by the price-
cost margin, moderates the evolution of wages for given employment perspectives. Recall that 
market power renders rent-sharing possible, but it also reduces the output and employment 
expansion expected to be derived from positive shocks, including innovations. Hence the 
negative and very significant sign points to the prevalence of the second effect. 
 
 The margin equation shows a clearly pro-cyclical margin that, in addition, falls sharply 
with the indicators of changes in competitive conduct ( the effects of the rivals’ price decreases 
and share increases variables are more efficiently picked up when added in a unique variable). 
Margin turns out to depend positively on the knowledge capital increases associated with the 
introduction of process or product innovations (recall that this is the content of k3 ). That is, 
prices tend to be revised to appropriate the advantages created by innovation. In fact, notice 
that the price reaction is enough, for instance, to almost outweigh the price decrease that the 
cost reduction associated to a process innovation could induce (0.32 vs. –0.35).        
 
 As a joint result of this fact and the impact of market power on wage growth, and 
despite the significant direct effect of knowledge capital on wages, the global average wage 
impact of knowledge capital is lower and does not differ significantly from zero (see Table 6). 
The interpretation is the following: unions try in principle to take advantage of the rents derived 
from  innovations in the form of higher wages, but the price increases planned by innovating 
firms with high market power tend to discourage the wage increases for fear of the 
employment effects. The estimated coefficients then tell us a sensible story for the period and 
sample concerned, especially  with respect to the rents derived from innovation (this may not 
have been the case with productivity increases with other origins). 
 
6.4 The employment effects of innovation 
  
 Table 7 combines the different estimated elasticities in a global assessment of the 
effects of innovation on the labour requirements of firms. We distinguish between short-run 
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effects, obtained by assuming that competitors do not react to the introduction by the firm of 
process and product innovations, and long-run effects, in whose computation we use the 
estimated cross-elasticities, assuming that competitors completely match the incumbent firm 
innovation and behaviour. Both types of effects can be divided into potential and corrected or 
actual. The latter embody the firm agents’ estimated behaviour. Of course these estimates are 
associated with very different levels of precision, as Table 6 renders clear. Nowadays, they 
give clear and sensible suggestions as to how and even how much innovation influences labour. 
 
 The most remarkable facts are the following. The displacement effect of process 
innovations is clearly surpassed (more than doubled) by the potential employment effect of a 
price decrease based on the reduction of marginal cost. In addition, product innovations show 
a direct effect on employment per unit of innovative expenditure that doubles the compensation 
effect of process innovations. The displacement effect is in turn hardly increased by 
substitution, and firms’ pricing behaviour appears as the main reason why compensation 
effects are weakened, although in competition with wages. Long-run compensation effects are, 
of course, lower. They suggest the persistence of weak potential positive effects of process 
innovations and relatively high potential effects of product innovations. Overall, actual elasticity 
of employment with respect to knowledge capital seems not to be far from unity, but it must 
also be taken into account that pricing behaviour can reverse the positive effects coming 
exclusively from process innovation. 
 
 The model does a good job of explaining the data of Table 1. Moreover, the 
comparison of the data with the model predictions produces interesting new insights. Assume 
that average labour productivity growth of the small and non-performing R&D firms (2.6%) 
was the baseline labour productivity growth during the period, reachable without accumulating 
knowledge capital (and different from the 1% total factor productivity growth shown by the 
production function because it consists of this 1%, plus the labour substitution associated to 
the wages increase, plus the effect of the tendency of “outsourcing” to grow over time). Given 
their knowledge capital evolution, a 0.5 displacement effect can explain around an additional 
percentage point of productivity growth for the small and big R&D performer firms. This does 
not leave much more labour productivity growth to be explained in the small performers (less 
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than 1 point) although much more in the biggest (3 percentage points). Assume now that 1.7% 
was the “normal” output growth during the period (again the output growth of the non-
performers, computable as the sum of productivity and employment growth). The higher 
(implicit) average output rates of growth of the performers of all sizes  can be easily explained 
assuming mild compensation effects coming from the rate of increase of the respective 
knowledge capitals.  
 
This comparison highlights two main things. Firstly, the model successfully explains 
important positive differences in the employment growth path of the innovative firms. But 
secondly, it also stresses that productivity increases induced by innovation constitute only a 
fraction of productivity growth, especially in what concerns labour productivity growth. Non-
innovation-related labour productivity growth emerges significantly in all types of firms and 
increases with size. Our model and data also suggest that this type of productivity increase, 
rooted in effects resembling process innovations together with the “outsourcing” of activities, 
can have serious negative effects on employment. 
 
7. Conclusion. 
               
 This paper has been aimed at structurally assessing the labour effects, and hence 
employment effects, of the innovative activities of firms. We have successfully estimated a 
structural econometric model to account for the firm-level displacement and compensation 
effects of innovation. Innovation has been measured jointly by means of the traditional stock of 
knowledge capital  and the available information on the firm introduction of process and 
product innovations. Implementation of the model has been rendered possible by the rich 
information available from an (unbalanced) panel sample representative of Spanish 
manufacturing firms, observed during the nineties. The main conclusions are as follows. 
 
 Innovation displaces labour but also creates the firm level conditions to over-
compensate this displacement. Process innovations significantly reduce marginal costs and this 
reduction can be passed on to prices to expand demand with an employment effect that 
doubles the first effect. In addition, product innovations, which most of the innovative firms 
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carry out at the same time (at a slightly smaller frequency) than process innovations, double the 
expanding effect obtained by unity of innovative expenditure. Positive potential net effects of 
process innovation are, however, estimated to be seriously reduced in the long run, when 
competitors match the innovations, but positive potential net effects of product innovation of a 
significant magnitude tend to persist in the long run. 
 
 However, the working of the compensation mechanisms can be dampened, and in 
some cases even completely outweighted, by the behaviour of the agents of the firm. In our 
sample, the  pricing by the firms endowed with market power, taking advantage of 
innovations, considerably weakens the expansive effects of innovation. And wages seems to 
refrain the same behaviour only because of the restraining effect of the exercise of market 
power by firms. In any case, average global actual net employment effects are estimated to be 
positive, even in the long-run, and with an elasticity value with respect to knowledge capital 
not far from unity.     
      
 Innovation is only one of the sources of firm-level productivity growth. Other sources 
are the non-innovative production improvements (embodied technical change, learning, spill-
overs) and, for labour productivity growth, substitution and the  “outsourcing” of firm 
activities. Our analysis also makes it apparent that these sources of productivity growth are 
forces governing the process of employment as well, at a level at least as important as 
innovation. The non-innovative production improvements can be compared with process 
innovations in which they can only have compensation effects through price reductions. If wage 
or pricing behaviour dampens the working of these mechanisms (which has not been 
specifically tested in this paper but is likely behaviour in many contexts), this productivity 
growth is likely to have negative net effects on employment. This plus “outsourcing” completes 
the picture to explain global employment evolution in our sample.      
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 Appendix A: Data. 
 
 All employed variables come from the information furnished by firms to the survey 
ESEE (see footnote 2). The unit surveyed is the firm, not the plant or establishment, and some 
firms closely related answer as a group. At the beginning of this survey, firms with fewer than 
200 workers were sampled randomly by industry and size strata, retaining 5%, while firms 
with more than 200 workers were all requested to participate, and the positive answers 
represented more or less a self-selected 60%. To preserve representation, samples of newly 
created firms were added to the initial sample every subsequent year. At the same time there 
are exits from the sample, coming from both death and attrition. The two motives can be 
distinguished and attrition was maintained to sensible limits. Composition in terms of time 
observations of the unbalanced panel sample employed here is shown in Table A.1.  
 
Definition of variables 
 
Advertising expenditure: Firm’s advertising expenditure deflated by the consumer price 
index. 
Aggregate wage:  Hourly economy-wide wage, taken from the Earnings Survey, INE. 
Divided by the consumer price index. 
Capacity utilization: Yearly average rate of capacity utilization reported by the firm. 
Capital stock: Capital at current replacement values is computed recursively from an initial 
estimate and the data on firms’ investments in equipment goods (but not buildings or financial 
assets), actualised by means of a price index of capital goods, and using sectoral estimates of 
the rates of depreciation. Real capital is then obtained by deflating the current replacement 
values. Details on this variable can be found in Martín and Suárez (1997). 
Entrant firm: Dummy variable that takes the value 1 when the firm has been created during 
the period. 
Exiting firm: Dummy variable that takes the value 1 when the firm is going to exit during the 
period (stop activity or leave manufacturing). 
Hours of work (total) : Total normal hours of work plus overtime minus lost hours, computed 
multiplying hours per worker by the number of workers. 
Hours per worker: Normal hours of work plus overtime minus lost hours per worker. 
Industry dummies: Eighteen industry dummies. 
Intermediate consumption: Sum of purchases of materials and external services minus the 
variation of intermediate inventories. Nominal intermediate consumption is deflated by the 
firm’s specific price index. 
Knowledge capital stock: Weighted sum of the firm’s real R&D expenditures, which include: 
the cost of R&D  intramural activities, payments for outside contracts and expenditures on 
imported technology (patent licenses and technical assistance). We construct a standard 
knowledge capital and three operative stocks: for process innovation, for product innovation 
and for both. Computation is fully explained in Appendix B. 
Market dynamism index: Weighted index of the market dynamism reported by the firm for 
the markets in which it operates. The index can take the values 0<d<0.5 (slump), 0.5<d<1 
(expansion) and d=0.5 (stable markets). Included in regressions in differences from 0.5. 
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Market share evolution index: Weighted index of the share evolution reported by the firm for 
the markets in which it operates. The index can take the values 0<s<0.5 (decreases), 0.5<s<1 
(increases) and s=0.5 (stable share). Included in regressions in differences from 0.5. 
Mark-up: Approximated by the value of output minus variable costs of production, divided by 
cost. Variable costs of production include total labour costs and intermediate consumption.  
Merger and acquisition: Dummy variable that takes the value 1 in the years subsequent to a 
merger or acquisition. In a few cases the succession of mergers imply an accumulated  dummy 
value higher than 1. 
Output: Goods and services production. Sales plus the variation of inventories deflated by the 
firm’s output price index. 
Price: Paasche-type price index computed starting from the percentage price changes that the 
firm reports to have made in the markets in which it operates. Divided by the consumer price 
index except when used as a deflator. 
Price cost margin: Approximated by the value of output minus variable costs of production, 
divided by value of output. Variable costs of production include total labour costs and 
intermediate consumption. 
Price of intermediate consumption: Paasche-type price index computed starting from the 
percentage variations in the prices of purchased materials, energy and services reported by the 
firms. Divided by the consumer price index except when used as a deflator. 
Price of materials: Percentage variation in the prices of purchased materials reported by the 
firm. Divided by the consumer price index. 
Product innovation: Dummy variable that takes the value 1 when the firm reports the 
accomplishment of product innovations. 
Process innovation: Dummy variable that takes the value 1 when the firm reports the 
introduction of a process innovation in its productive process. 
Proportion of temporary workers: Proportion of workers under fixed term contracts which 
carry very small or no firing costs.  
Rivals’ share increase: Dummy variable that takes the value 1 when the firm reports a rivals’ 
share increase (a fall in its share; see the variable Market share evolution index)  
Rivals’ price decrease: Dummy variable that takes the value 1 when the firm reports an own-
price decrease which has been motivated by a reduction of prices of competitors in its main 
market. 
Sales: Firm sales deflated by the firm’s output price. 
Scission: Dummy variable with value 1 in the years subsequent to a scission. In a few cases 
the succession of scissions implies an accumulated  dummy value higher than 1. 
Size: Dummy variable that takes the value 1 when the firm has more than 200 workers.  
Unemployment rate: Taken from the Population Activity Survey, INE 
User cost of capital: Weighted sum of the cost of the firm values for two types of long-term 
debt ( long-term debt with banks and other long-term debt), plus a common depreciation rate 
of 0.15 and minus the rate of growth of the consumer price index.  
Wage: Firm’s hourly wage rate (total labour cost divided by effective total hours of work). 
Divided by the consumer price index. 
Workers: Approximation to the average number of workers during the year. 
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Appendix B: Knowledge capital construction  
 
 Knowledge capital is assumed to be zero for firms which are not observed to do any 
R&D spending during their time in the sample. Firms with positive expenditure can be 
classified into two types: firms born during the period (entrant firms) and firms with likely pre-
sample formal innovative activity. Knowledge capital of entrants is assumed to grow starting 
from their first R&D investments and, when it is the case, we drop the pre-investment 
observations to avoid attributing a value to the rate of growth corresponding to the zero-
positive capital change. Firms with likely pre-sample activity are estimated an initial or pre-
sample knowledge capital stock. 
 A firm’s knowledge capital K for sample year t is computed recursively with the usual 
formula 
     
 11)1( -- +-= ttt RKK d  
 
where R stands for  R&D expenditure (current expenditure is assumed to be transformed into 
useful knowledge with a lag). Expenditures are deflated with the consumer price index and 
d is assumed to have a value of 0.15. Results are, as usual, not sensible to modifications of 
this rate.   
To compute the pre-sample capital of  a firm in moment t (first firm observation), we 
attribute the average sample (deflated) expenditure to the s previous years of the firm life using 
the formula 
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where R  is average observed expenditure and [ ]agefirmts ,199010min -+= . That is, 
we use the real age of the firm while it does not imply the accumulation of expenditures 
previous to the year 1980. We experimented replacing this limit with the inclusion of different 
weighting schemes for the R&D expenditures previous to 1990, but results did not differ very 
much and performed worse in regressions.  
 Operative capitals for process and product innovation K1, K2 and K3 are computed 
from K and the innovation dummies as explained in the text.  
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Table 1 
Knowledge capital, innovation and labour 1991-98 
 No. of firms 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1991-98 
           
More than 200 workers  433          
           
   R&D performers 397 (91.7%)          
     Knowledge capital (% of growth1)  7.7 0.4 1.2 -0.1 3.5 0.5 2.1 3.0 2.1 
     Labour productivity (% of growth1)  6.5 3.9 2.5 11.1 9.9 5.6 6.6 6.2 6.6 
     Labour input (% of growth1)  -4.9 -7.1 -9.3 -0.9 1.9 -1.9 1.4 1.8 -2.5 
     Freq. of process innov. (% of years2)          53.9 
     Freq. of product innov. (% of years2)          40.9 
           
Up to 200 workers  853          
           
    R&D performers  349 (40.9%)          
      Knowledge capital (% of growth1)  3.6 6.5 -0.0 2.1 1.3 0.9 3.8 5.4 2.7 
      Labour productivity (% of growth1)  7.7 0.1 -1.7 7.8 9.0 2.7 5.5 4.3 4.4 
      Labour input (% of growth1)  0.9 -2.0 -4.8 1.6 2.3 1.0 2.6 3.3 0.6 
      Freq. of process innov. (% of years2)          38.2 
      Freq. of product innov. (% of years2)          33.5 
           
    R&D non-performers 504 (59.1%)          
      Labour productivity (% of growth1)  3.3 3.7 -0.7 3.7 5.6 0.2 1.5 4.7 2.6 
      Labour input (% of growth1)  -1.9 -2.9 -6.9 -1.1 1.3 0.2 2.3 2.0 -0.9 
      Freq. of process innov. (% of years2)          16.9 
      Freq. of product innov. (%of years2)          13.0 
Total 1286          
1 Average of individual log-rates. 2 Average of individual percentages.
 Table 2 
Firms’ production function estimates 
 
 
Sample period: 1992-98 
No. of firms: 1,286; No of observations: 5,199 
Estimation method: variables in log-differences, GMM estimates1 
 
Dependent variable: yp 
 
Independent 
variables2 
a b c d e 
      
Constant 0.012 (1.4) 0.009 (1.1) 0.011 (1.4) 0.006 (0.7) 0.009 (1.2) 
k1 0.39 (2.4) 0.28 (1.7) 0.36 (2.1)  0.35 (2.1) 
k    0.21 (1.4)  
c 0.15 (1.4) 0.25 0.21 0.21 0.20 
l 0.30 (3.2)  0.34 (4.2) 0.34 (4.4) 0.35 (4.4) 
n  0.30 (3.5)    
h  0.30 (1.3)    
m 0.46 (13.5) 0.45 (13.6) 0.45 (14.5) 0.45 (14.3) 0.45 (14.1) 
cu 0.09 (4.2) 0.09 (3.9)  0.08 (4.1) 0.09 (4.1) 
      
Industry dummies3 Inc. Inc. Inc. Inc. Inc. 
Time dummies3 Inc. Inc. Inc. Inc. Inc. 
      
      
m1  -6.7 -6.5 -6.5 -6.4 -6.7 
m2 -0.3 -0.1 -0.5 -0.4 -0.2 
Sargan  test (df) 25.9 (25) 28.7 (32) 26.2 (26) 32.4 (26) 26.2 (26) 
Wald test (df) 0.8 (1)     
 
Heteroskedasticity robust t-ratios shown in parentheses 
1 IVs: k 1 and l lagged levels t-2 and t-3 at each cross-section, lagged log-differences of c, and one size 
dummy (>200 workers). 
2 Wald test allows us to accept constant returns to scale. Estimates from b to e impose the constraint.  
3 18 industry dummies and 7 year dummies, with the coefficients of both sets constrained to add up to 
zero; dummies for entrant and exiting firms, as well as mergers and scissions, also included.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
             
Table 3 
Firms’ labour demand estimates 
 
 
Sample period: 1992-98 
No. of firms: 1,286; No of observations: 5,199 
Estimation method: variables in log-differences, GMM estimates1 
 
Dependent variable: l-y 
 
Independent variables2 a b c d 
     
Constant -0.038 (7.9) -0.039 (7.9) -0.04(8.8) -0.038 (-8.4) 
lt-1 0.09 (1.0)  0.10 (1.1) 0.09 (1.0) 
wc 0.21 (1.2) 0.20 0.24 0.24 
wl -0.67 (-2.6) -0.60 (-2.4) -0.66 (-3.3) -0.66 (-3.3) 
wm 0.22 (1.3) 0.40 (2.8) 0.42 (3.3) 0.42 (3.2) 
k1 -0.50 (-2.4) -0.52 (-2.3)  -0.46 (-2.2) 
k   0.21 (1.4)  
     
Industry dummies3 Inc. Inc. Inc. Inc. 
Time dummies3 Inc. Inc. Inc. Inc. 
     
     
m1  -4.0 -4.2 -4.1 -4.1 
m2 -0.2 -0.5 -0.1 -0.2 
Sargan  test (df) 37.8 (40) 28.3 (29) 39.2 (41) 36.9 (41) 
Wald test (df) 0.1 (1)    
 
Heteroskedasticity robust t-ratios shown in parentheses 
1 IVs:  l lagged levels t-2 and t-3 at each cross section (except in estimate b), wl lagged levels t-3 and t-4 at 
each cross section, lagged  log-differences of wc, k 1 lagged levels from t-2 to t-4 at each cross-section and 
one size dummy (>200 workers). 
2 Wald test allows us to accept homogeneity of degree 0 in prices. Estimates from b to d impose the 
constraint. 
 3 18 industry dummies and 7 year dummies, with the coefficients of both sets constrained to add up to 
zero; dummies for entrant and exiting firms, as well as mergers and scissions, also included.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
             
Table 4 
Firms’ product demand estimates 
 
Sample period: 1992-98 
No. of firms: 1,286; No of observations: 5,199 
Estimation method: variables in log-differences, GMM estimates1 
 
Dependent variable: yd 
 
Independent variables a b c d 
     
Constant -0.008 (-0.8) -0.029 (-1.9) -0.019 (-1.3) -0.024 (-1.53) 
k2 1.16 (1.9) 2.07 (2.5)  1.89 (2.2) 
k   0.72 (1.4)  
d 0.78 (6.5) 0.96 (5.8) 0.98 (6.2) 1.01 (5.9) 
Dd 0.47 (5.6) 0.24 (1.7) 0.40 (3.2) 0.26 (1.8) 
a 0.07 (3.0) 0.06 (1.8) 0.06 (2.0) 0.05 (1.7) 
p -1.38 (-4.3) -1.79 (-4.8) -2.47 (-4.8) -2.41 (-4.3) 
wc  0.13 (0.3) 0.20 (0.6) 0.16 (0.3) 
wl  0.21 (2.2) 0.20 (2.1) 0.21 (2.1)  
wm  0.40 (1.9) 0.59 (2.5) 0.50 (2.1) 
rsi  -0.74 (-3.3) -0.49 (-2.9) -0.77 (-3.3) 
rpd -0.12 (-1.30)  -0.40 (-3.0) -0.34 (-2.3) 
     
Industry dummies2 Inc. Inc. Inc. Inc. 
Time dummies2 Inc. Inc. Inc. Inc. 
     
     
m1  -2.4 -3.7 -3.0 -3.6 
m2 -1.3 -0.9 -1.0 -0.9 
Sargan  test (df) 44.6 (17) 29.7 (17) 37.2 (17) 27.4 (17) 
 
Heteroskedasticity robust t-ratios shown in parentheses 
1 IVs:  k 2 (or k) lagged levels t-3 and t-4 at each cross section, p lagged level t-2 at each cross section, 
lagged  levels of d, a and rpd, and rsi levels lagged twice, lagged log-differences of wc, and the process 
innovation dummy, the number of workers, and the growth rate of the price of raw materials. 
2 18 industry dummies and 7 year dummies, with the coefficients of both sets constrained to add up to 
zero; dummies for entrant and exiting firms, as well as mergers and scissions, also included.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
             
Table 5 
Wage and margin equations 
 
 
Sample period: 1992-98 
No. of firms: 1,286; No of observations: 5,199 
Estimation method: variables in log-differences, GMM estimates1,2 
 
Dependent variable: wl                                                                           Dependent variable: )1ln( m+D  
 
Independent variables a b Independent  variables a 
     
Constant -0.012 (-2.1) -0.012 (-2.2) Constant -0.005 (-1.6) 
wlt-1 0.16 (3.6) 0.17 (4.2) d 0.033 (3.1) 
we 0.99 (2.1) 0.99 (2.1) k3 0.32 (2.4) 
u -0.08 (2.3) -0.05 (-1.5) rsi+rpd -0.06 (-2.5) 
d  0.026 (2.3)   
a  0.009 (0.8)   
wc  -0.13 (-0.8)   
wm  -0.13 (-2.3)   
nt-1 -0.15 (-1.6) -0.10 (-1.2)   
k  0.39 (2.4) 0.31 (2.2)   
pcm -0.51 (-5.1) -0.52 (-5.2)   
b -0.186 (-1.7) -0.15 (-1.5)   
     
Industry dummies3 Inc. Inc. Industry dummies3 Inc. 
Time dummies3   Time dummies3 Inc. 
     
     
m1  -9.3 -9.4 m1 -6.3 
m2 -1.5 -1.3 m2 -1.0 
Sargan  test (df) 49.6 (38) 48.5 (38) Sargan test (df) 13.3 (10) 
 
Heteroskedasticity robust t-ratios shown in parentheses 
1 Wage equation IVs:  lagged levels t-2 and t-3 of variable n and lagged levels t-2 of variables wl ,  k, pcm 
and b at each cross section, dummies of process and product innovation. Lagged log-differences of a and 
wc, and the growth rate of the price of raw materials. 
2 Margin equation IV’s: k 3 lagged values t-2 at each cross section, rdi level lagged twice and rpi level 
lagged once, dummies of process and product innovation, and price and market share evolution index 
levels lagged twice.  
3 18 industry dummies and 7 year dummies, with the coefficients of both sets constrained to add up to 
zero; dummies for entrant and exiting firms, as well as mergers and scissions, also included.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
             
 
Table 6 
Main estimated elasticities 
 
 
 
Elasticity Symbol Estimated value (Standard error) 
 
Labour  
and marginal cost wrt knowledge capital1 
e  -0.35 (0.17) 
 
Output wrt labour1 
a  0.35 (0.08) 
 
Sales wrt knowledge capital1 
l  1.89 (0.84) 
 
Sales wrt rivals’ knowledge capital2 
Rl  -0.47 (0.33) 
 
Sales wrt price1 
h -2.41 (0.55) 
 
Sales wrt rivals’ price2 
Rh  0.87 (0.51) 
 
Wage wrt knowledge capital3 
g  0.19 (0.19) 
 
Margin wrt knowledge capital1 
q  0.32 (0.13) 
 
Robust standard errors of non-directly estimated elasticities are computed from linear approximations to 
their formulas neglecting (setting to zero) the cross-equation parameter covariances. 
  
1 Coefficients of estimates e, d and a in tables 2, 4 and 5 respectively. 
2  Rh  computed from the sum of input price coefficients in estimate d of Table 4; Rl  computed from the 
coefficient on rsi plus ehR . 
3 g  computed from the long-run value of the sum of the direct and indirect capital effects in estimate b of 
Table 5: )1/())1(( 10 ljqmjgg m -++=
- , where lj is the coefficient on lagged wage and m  is evaluated 
at the sample mean. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
             
Table 7 
Firms’ employment effects of innovation 
(percentage variations corresponding to a 1% variation of knowledge capital1) 
  Short-run estimates Long-run estimates2  
  Potential Corrected Potential  Corrected 
      
Displacement effect e-  -0.35  -0.35  
        plus labour substitution effect (wage premia effect) ga)1( --   -0.12  -0.12 
Corrected displacement effect   -0.47  -0.47 
      
      
Process innovation (price decrease effect)      he  0.84  0.54  
Product innovation  l  1.89  1.42  
Compensation (demand) effects  2.73  1.96  
         minus cost increase effect (wage premia effect) hag-   -0.16  -0.10 
         minus price increase effect (margin premia effect) hq-   -0.77  -0.49 
Corrected compensation effects   1.80  1.37 
      
Total effect (displacement + compensation)   2.38 1.33 1.61 0.90 
1 Computed from the elasticity estimates of Table 6. 
2 Long-run estimates use product and price effects net of rivals’ similar product introduction and price movements, i.e., they are computed using the net  
elasticities Rll-  and Rhh- .
             
 
 
Table A1 
Firms by no. of observations 
 
No. of observations No. of firms 
3 172 
4 220 
5 186 
6 146 
7 158 
8 173 
9 231 
Total 1286 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
             
Table A2   
     Variable descriptive statistics 
Variables Symbol Mean1 S. dev. Min Max 
Advertising expenditure (growth rate2) a 0.026 0.904 -2.000 2.000 
Aggregate wage (growth rate3) e
lw  0.010 0.009 -0.008 0.025 
Capacity utilization cu 0.796 0.155 0.050 1.000 
Capital stock (growth rate3) c 0.081 0.316 -2.052 7.280 
Entrant firm (dummy)  0.022 0.147 0 1 
Exiting firm (dummy)  0.039 0.193 0 1 
Hours of work (total) (growth rate3) l -0.010 0.189 -2.159 1.749 
Hours per worker (growth rate3) h -0.001 0.072 -1.698 1.650 
Intermediate consumption  (growth rate3) m 0.024 0.371 -3.606 5.375 
Knowledge capital stock ( growth rate3) k 0.014 0.223 -0.165 3.207 
Market dynamism index4  d 0.497 0.322 0 1 
Market share evolution index4 s 0.538 0.293 0 1 
Mark-up m  0.114 0.169 -0.933 2.139 
Merger and acquisition (dummy)  0.013 0.114 0 1 
Output (growth rate3) yp 0.034 0.265 -3.221 2.569 
Price (growth rate3) p -0.025 0.059 -0.751 1.053 
Price cost margin  pcm 0.079 0.241 -13.920 0.681 
Price  int. consumption (growth rate3) wm -0.004 0.062 -0.546 0.894 
Price of materials (growth rate3)  -0.002 0.080 -0.866 1.053 
Product innovation (dummy)  0.344 0.475 0 1 
Process innovation (dummy)  0.272 0.445 0 1 
Proportion  temporary workers e 0.198 0.215 0 1 
Rivals’ share increase (dummy) rsi 0.227  0.419 0 1 
Rivals’ price decrease (dummy) rpi 0.060 0.238 0 1 
Sales (growth rate3) ys 0.035 0.288 -5.471 5.913 
Scission (dummy)  0.007 0.081 0 1 
Unemployment rate4  u 0.214 0.023 0.169 0.239 
User cost of capital  wc 0.134 0.047 0.091 0.354 
Wage (growth rate) wl 0.014 0.196 -3.001 2.387 
Workers (growth rate3) n -0.009 0.172 -2.061 1.749 
1 Simple averages of individual values 1991-1998. 2  Growth rates computed as )(
2
1
/)( 11 -- +- tttt xxxx . 
 3 Average log-rate. 4 Included in the regressions in differences from the mean. 5 Index divided by the 
consumer price index.  
